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The Legacy of bin Laden and National Security 
Major Jeremy Reeves 
 
The daring raid on the compound in Abbottabad by our country's most elite servicemen has been 
widely touted as a tremendous success both here and abroad. However, to believe the United States 
is more secure after the death of Osama bin Laden (OBL) is a naive notion. Osama the man is dead, 
but his legacy lives on. 
Al Qaeda was never about one man. While OBL played an important role in the attacks of 
September 11th, scores of others were involved, including OBL's recently named successor, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri. Furthermore, there is essentially no evidence linking OBL to the most notorious attacks 
since, the Madrid railway bombings in 2004 and the London bombings in 2005. His death may have 
come as a blow to AQ's leadership, but there are others both willing and able to pick up his mantle 
of Islamic extremism and continue to terrorize the West. 
Indeed, bin Laden's greatest achievement is not the 9/11 attacks, but rather the establishment of the 
al Qaeda “brand.” Jason Burke, in his well-written book, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, 
describes how OBL created AQ from three elements: a hardcore of devoted followers who stayed 
with him since the 1980s, a network of co-opted terrorist organizations, and an innovative 
ideology.108 This ideology, described by Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, 
chiefly consists of the “defensive jihad.” He goes on to say, “Bin Laden's genius lies...in constructing 
and articulating a consistent, convincing case that an attack on Islam is under way and is being led 
and directed by America.”109 As such, it is every Muslims duty to join in the defensive jihad by 
attacking Americans.  
Burke explains how this ideology continues to resonate with millions of Muslims even though the 
AQ hardcore were scattered or killed in the invasion of Afghanistan and the ongoing war on terror. 
Today, the co-opted groups continue to operate and attack US interests around the world, taking on 
names such as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). As Burke says, their members continue to “look up to bin Laden as 
a symbolic leader...acting in the style of al Qaeda, along the agenda of al Qaeda,” though they were 
never directly controlled by OBL. 110  Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, popularly known as the 
“Underwear Bomber,” provides the premier example. Intelligence sources offer ample evidence of 
his connections to AQAP, specifically Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's senior recruiter. 
However, there are no ties between Abdulmutallab and OBL. The attempted attack was carried 
without the assistance of AQ's leader. 
The security threat this country now faces goes beyond proclaimed members of al Qaeda-affiliated 
organizations. In February, the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified before 
Congress that terrorism is still the greatest threat to the U.S, and he noted “disturbing instances of 
self-radicalization among our own citizens.”111 In an op-ed piece for CNN.com, former CIA 
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Qaeda’s structure, the organization is turning to “less complex, less well-organized…but more 
frequent” actions that are “more domestic in [their] origin.”112 Recent attacks and attempted attacks 
executed by US citizens have supported these notions: the attempt on Times Square, the New York 
City subway plot, and the Ft. Hood shootings, to name a few. 
The perpetrators of these events were not radicalized by OBL directly. Bin Laden did not order the 
attacks nor did he provide material assistance. Rather the attackers and would-be attackers were 
radicalized, received some if not all of their training, and planned their operations with the help of 
the internet. Scheuer notes that bin Laden and al Qaeda became increasingly more adept at utilizing 
the World Wide Web since 9/11, not only for communication, but also as a means of sharing 
training, educational, and attack planning materials as well as standardizing curriculum.113 The State 
Department’s 2009 Country Reports on Terrorism cited al Qaeda’s continued use of “both the Internet 
as a means to distribute propaganda and telecommunications infrastructure to plan attacks and 
coordinate movements.”114 Despite our government's efforts, these online sources still exist and 
allow bin Laden to continue to recruit, train, and motivate despite his demise.  
Finally, while the raid may have killed America's “Most Wanted,” it may have also helped kill an 
extremely important relationship in our global fight against terror. On May 2nd, American military 
forces flew into a sovereign country with a known nuclear weapon capability for the express purpose 
of a targeted killing. Pakistani officials were not informed of the operation until after the fact. This 
calls into question America's sincerity when our government asserts the need for “building security 
partnerships” as stated in the most recent National Strategy for Counterterrorism.115 The already strained 
relationship between the US and Pakistan was further weakened by this action. While never the 
model ally, Pakistani government officials have made significant strides in capturing al Qaeda 
operatives, provided key intelligence, and to some degree demonstrated a willingness to assist in our 
country's war on terror. However, a recent Pew poll now shows that the majority of Pakistanis view 
the US as more of an enemy than an ally.116 Their government officials, already incensed by 
continued Predator incursions into Pakistani airspace, now have further impetus to look to 
burgeoning superpowers such as China for strategic alliances.  
In no way am I insinuating bin Laden's death was a bad thing. While the legality of the raid may be 
called into question and the political implications continue to be resolved, OBL's death provided a 
tremendous boost to a war-weary country and struck a critical blow to AQ. He undoubtedly 
continued to play some sort of role in the organization's operations despite being severely 
constrained. In addition, the computers, notes, and other information seized in the raid will aid in 
future operations against the Islamic extremists. However, these victories represent battles in what 
continues to be the long war against international terrorism. OBL’s legacy continues to threaten our 
national security. 	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The notion that his death has made our country more secure is unreasonable. The ideas he 
convincingly espoused for decades are now doctrine to a myriad of al Qaeda brand organizations, 
millions of eager jihadists, thousands of potential martyrs, and a host of sympathizers all over the 
world. This is reflected in his very own words when he stated, “Regardless if Osama is killed or 
survives, the awakening has started, praise be to God.”117 It is this awakening that America must 
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